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D a l eW .J o r g e n s o na n dE r i cY i p
12.1 Introduction
In this paper we present international comparisons of patterns of eco-
nomic growth among the G7 countries over the period 1960–95. Between
1960 and 1973 productivity growth accounted for more than half of
growth in output per capita for France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the
United Kingdom and somewhat less than half of output growth in Canada
and the United States. The relative importance of productivity declined
substantially after 1973, accounting for a predominant share of growth
between 1973 and 1989 only for France.
Since 1989 productivity growth has almost disappeared as a source of
economic growth in the G7 countries. Between 1989 and 1995 productivity
growth was negative for ﬁve of the G7 countries, with positive growth only
for Japan and the United States. The level of productivity for Canada in
1995 fell almost to the level ﬁrst achieved in 1973, and declines in Italy
and the United Kingdom brought productivity down to the levels of 1974
and 1978, respectively. Since 1989 input per capita has grown more slowly
than the average for the period 1960–89, except for Germany.
The United States has retained its lead in output per capita throughout
the period 1960–95. The United States has also led the G7 countries in
input per capita, while relinquishing its lead in productivity to France.
However, the United States has lagged behind Canada, France, Germany,
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509Italy, and Japan in the growth of output per capita, surpassing only the
United Kingdom. Except for Germany and the United Kingdom, the
United States has lagged behind all the G7 countries in growth in input
per capita, and U.S. productivity growth has exceeded only that of Canada
and the United Kingdom.
Japan exhibited considerably higher growth rates in output per capita
and productivity than the other G7 countries from 1960 to 1995, but most
of these gains took place before 1973. Japan’s productivity level, along
with the levels of Germany and Italy, remain among the lowest in the G7.
Japan’s performance in output per capita owes more to high input per
capita than to high productivity. The growth of Japanese input per capita
greatly exceeded that for other G7 countries, especially prior to 1973.
During the period 1960–95, economic performance among the G7
countries became more uniform. The dispersion of levels of output per
capita fell sharply before 1970 and has declined modestly since then. The
dispersion in productivity levels also fell before 1970 and has remained
within a narrow range. The dispersion of levels of input per capita has
been stable throughout the period 1960–95. However, the relative posi-
tions of the G7 countries have been altered considerably with the dramatic
rise of Japan and the gradual decline of the United Kingdom.
We can rationalize the important changes in economic performance that
have taken place among the G7 countries on the basis of the neoclassical
theory of economic growth, extended to incorporate persistent diﬀerences
among countries. Productivity growth is exogenous, whereas investment is
endogenous to the theory. Obviously, the relative importance of exogenous
productivity growth has been greatly reduced, and a more prominent role
must be assigned to endogenous investment in tangible assets and human
capital.
In section 12.2 we describe the methodology for allocating the sources
of economic growth between investment and productivity. We introduce
constant quality indexes of capital and labor inputs that incorporate the
impacts of investments in tangible assets and human capital. The constant
quality index of labor input combines diﬀerent types of hours worked by
means of relative wage rates. The constant quality index of capital input
weights diﬀerent types of capital stocks by rental rates, rather than the
asset prices used for weighting capital stocks.
Diﬀe r e n ce si nw a g er a t e sf o rd i ﬀerent types of labor inputs reﬂect invest-
ments in human capital through education and training, so that a constant
quality index of labor input is the channel for the impact of these invest-
ments on economic performance. The constant quality index of capital
input includes a perpetual inventory of investments in tangible assets. The
index also incorporates diﬀerences in rental prices that capture the diﬀer-
ential impacts of these investments.
In section 12.3 we analyze the role of investment and productivity as
510 Dale W. Jorgenson and Eric Yipsources of growth in the G7 countries over the period 1960–95. We sub-
divide this period at 1973 to identify changes in performance after the ﬁrst
oil crisis. We employ 1989 as another dividing point to focus on the most
recent experience. We decompose growth of output per capita for each
country between growth of productivity and growth of input per capita.
Finally, we decompose the growth of input per capita into components as-
sociated with investments in tangible assets and human capital.
International comparisons reveal important similarities among the G7
countries. Investments in tangible assets and human capital now account
for the overwhelming proportion of economic growth in the G7 countries
and also explain the predominant share of international diﬀerences in out-
put per capita. Heterogeneity in capital and labor inputs and changes in
the composition of these inputs over time are essential for identifying per-
sistent international diﬀerences and for accounting for growth.
In section 12.4 we test the important implication of the neoclassical
theory of growth that relative levels of output and input per capita must
converge over time. For this purpose we employ the coeﬃcient of variation
to measure convergence of levels of output per capita, input per capita,
and productivity among the G7 countries over the period 1960–95. As
before, we divide the period at 1973 and 1989. We also analyze the conver-
gence of capital and labor inputs per capita implied by the theory.
In section 12.5 we summarize the conclusions of our study and outline
alternative approaches to endogenous growth through broadening the con-
cept of investment. The mechanism for endogenous accumulation of tan-
gible assets captured in Solow’s (1956) version of the neoclassical theory
provides the most appropriate point of departure. Investments in human
capital, especially investment in education, can now be incorporated into
the theory. When measures of the output of R&D activities become avail-
able, investment in intellectual capital can be made endogenous.
12.2 Investment and Productivity
Ongoing debates over the relative importance of investment and produc-
tivity in economic growth coincide with disputes about the appropriate
role for the public sector. Productivity can be identiﬁed with spillovers of
beneﬁts that fail to provide incentives for actors within the private sector.
Advocates of a larger role for the public sector hold the position that these
spillovers can be guided into appropriate channels by an all-wise and be-
neﬁcent government. By contrast proponents of a smaller government
search for methods of decentralizing investment decisions among partici-
pants in the private sector.
Profound diﬀerences in policy implications militate against any simple
resolution of the debate on the relative importance of investment and pro-
ductivity. Proponents of income redistribution will not lightly abandon the
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necessity of providing incentives for investment. Advocates of growth
strategies based on capital formation will not readily give credence to
claims of spillovers to beneﬁciaries who are diﬃcult or impossible to
identify.
To avoid the semantic confusion that pervades popular discussions of
economic growth, it is essential to be precise in deﬁning investment. In-
vestment is the commitment of current resources in the expectation of fu-
ture returns and can take a multiplicity of forms. The distinctive feature of
investment as a source of economic growth is that the returns can be inter-
nalized by the investor. The most straightforward application of this deﬁ-
nition is to investment in tangible assets that creates property rights, in-
cluding rights to the incomes that accrue to the owners of the assets.
The mechanism by which tangible investments are translated into eco-
nomic growth is well understood. For example, an investor in a new indus-
trial facility adds to the supply of these facilities and generates a stream
of property income. Investment and income are linked through markets
for capital assets and their services. The increase in capital input contri-
butes to output growth in proportion to the marginal product of capital.
The stream of property income can be divided between capital input and
its marginal product. Identifying this marginal product with the rental
price of capital provides the basis for a constant quality index of capital
input.
The seminal contributions of Becker (1993), Machlup (1962), Mincer
(1974), and Schultz (1961) have given concrete meaning to a notion of
wealth including investments that do not create property rights. For ex-
ample, a student enrolled in school or a worker participating in a training
program can be viewed as an investor. Although these investments do not
create assets that can be bought or sold, the returns to higher educational
qualiﬁcations or better skills in the workplace can be internalized by the
investor.
An individual who completes a course of education or training adds to
the supply of people with higher qualiﬁcations or skills. The resulting
stream of labor income can be divided between labor input and its mar-
ginal product. The increase in labor contributes to output growth in pro-
portion to the marginal product. Identifying this marginal product with
the wage rate provides the basis for a constant quality index of labor input.
Although there are no asset markets for human capital, investments in
human and nonhuman capital have in common that returns to these in-
vestments can be internalized.
The deﬁning characteristic of productivity as a source of economic
growth is that the incomes generated by higher productivity are external
to the economic activities that generate growth. Publicly supported R&D
programs are a leading illustration of activities that stimulate productivity
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ﬁnanced by public subsidies to private laboratories. The resulting beneﬁts
are external to the economic units conducting R&D. These beneﬁts must
be carefully distinguished from the private beneﬁts of R&D that can be
internalized through the creation of intellectual property rights.1
The allocation of sources of economic growth between investment and
productivity is critical for assessing the explanatory power of growth the-
ory. Only substitution between capital and labor inputs resulting from in-
vestment in tangible assets is endogenous in Solow’s (1956) neoclassical
theory of growth. However, substitution among diﬀerent types of labor
inputs is the consequence of investment in human capital, whereas invest-
ment in tangible assets induces substitution among diﬀerent types of capi-
tal inputs. Neither form of substitution is incorporated into Solow’s (1957)
model of production.
The distinction between substitution and technical change emphasized
by Solow (1957) parallels the distinction between investment and produc-
tivity as sources of economic growth. However, Solow’sd e ﬁnition of in-
vestment, like that of Kuznets (1971), was limited to tangible assets. Both
speciﬁcally excluded investments in human capital by relying on increases
in undiﬀerentiated hours of work as a measure of the contribution of la-
bor input.
The contribution of investment in tangible assets to economic growth is
proportional to the rental price of capital, which reﬂects the marginal
product of capital. By contrast the asset price of capital reﬂects the present
value of the income from a capital asset over its entire lifetime. Both Kuz-
nets (1971) and Solow (1970) identiﬁed the contributions of tangible assets
to growth with increases in the stock of capital, weighted by asset prices.
By failing to employ the marginal products of tangible assets as weights,
Kuznets and Solow misallocated the sources of economic growth between
investment in tangible assets and productivity.2
Investment can be made endogenous within a neoclassical growth
model, whereas productivity growth is exogenous. If productivity greatly
predominates among sources of growth, as indicated by Kuznets (1971)
and Solow (1970), most of growth is determined exogenously. Reliance on
the Solow residual as an explanatory factor is a powerful indictment of the
limitations of the neoclassical framework. This viewpoint was expressed
by Abramovitz (1956), who famously characterized the Solow residual as
a measure of our ignorance.
Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) introduced constant quality indexes of
capital and labor inputs and a constant quality measure of investment
1. Griliches (1992, 1995) has provided detailed surveys of spillovers from R&D investment.
Griliches (1992) gives a list of survey papers on spillovers.
2. The measurement conventions of Kuznets and Solow remain in common use. See, for
example, Hall and Jones (1999) and the references given by Jorgenson (1990).
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productivity. This greatly broadened the concept of substitution employed
by Solow (1957) and altered, irrevocably, the allocation of economic
growth between investment and productivity. They showed that 85 percent
of U.S. economic growth could be attributed to investment, whereas pro-
ductivity accounted for only 15 percent (Jorgenson and Griliches 1967,
table IX, p. 272).
The measure of labor input employed by Jorgenson and Griliches com-
bined diﬀerent types of hours worked, weighted by wage rates, into a con-
stant quality index of labor input, using methodology that Griliches (1960)
had developed for U.S. agriculture.3 Their constant quality index of capital
input combined diﬀerent types of capital inputs by means of rental rates,
rather than the asset prices appropriate for measuring capital stock. This
model of capital as a factor of production was introduced by Jorgenson
(1963) and made possible the incorporation of diﬀerences in capital con-
sumption and the tax treatment of diﬀerent types of capital income.4
Jorgenson and Griliches identiﬁed technology with a production possi-
bility frontier. This extended the aggregate production function—intro-
duced by Douglas (1948) and developed by Tinbergen (1959) and Solow
(1957)—to include two outputs, investment and consumption goods. Jor-
genson (1966) showed that economic growth could be interpreted, equiv-
alently as embodied in investment in the sense of Solow (1960) or dis-
embodied in productivity growth. Jorgenson and Griliches removed this
indeterminacy by introducing constant quality price indexes for invest-
ment goods.
Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) have recently revived So-
low’s (1960) concept of embodied technical change. Greenwood, Herco-
witz, and Krusell have applied the constant quality indexes for producers’
durable equipment constructed by Gordon (1990) to capital input, but not
to the output of investment goods, as Gordon did. Within the framework
presented by Jorgenson (1966) both the output of investment goods and
the input of capital services must be revised in order to hold the quality
of investment goods constant. This approach has been employed by Jor-
genson and Stiroh (1995, 1999) in assessing the impact of investment in
information technology. For this purpose they employ constant quality
price indexes for computers and related equipment from the U.S. National
Income and Product Accounts.
3. Constant quality indexes of labor input are discussed in detail by Jorgenson, Gollop,
and Fraumeni (1987), Chapters 3 and 8, pp. 69–108 and 261–300; Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS; 1993); and Ho and Jorgenson (1999).
4. Detailed surveys of empirical research on the measurement of capital input are given
by Jorgenson (1996) and Triplett (1996). BLS (1983) compiled a constant quality index of
capital input for its oﬃcial estimates of productivity, renamed multifactor productivity. BLS
retained hours worked as a measure of labor input until 11 July 1994, when it released a new
multifactor productivity measure incorporating a constant quality index of labor input.
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productivity in a complete system of U.S. national accounts. They pro-
vided a much more detailed model of capital input based on the frame-
work for the taxation of corporate capital income developed by Hall and
Jorgenson (1967, 1969, 1971). Christensen and Jorgenson extended this
framework to include noncorporate and household capital incomes. This
captured the impact of diﬀerences in returns to diﬀerent types of capital
inputs more fully.
Christensen and Jorgenson identiﬁed the production account with a
production possibility frontier describing technology and the income and
expenditure account with a social welfare function describing consumer
preferences. Following Kuznets (1961), they divided the uses of economic
growth between consumption and saving. They linked saving to the wealth
account through capital accumulation equations for each type of asset.
Prices for diﬀerent vintages of assets were linked to rental prices of capital
inputs through a parallel set of capital asset pricing equations.
In 1973 Christensen and Jorgenson constructed internally consistent in-
come, product, and wealth accounts. Separate product and income ac-
counts are integral parts of both the U.S. National Income and Product
Accounts5 and the United Nations’ (1968) System of National Accounts
designed by Stone.6 However, neither system included wealth accounts
consistent with the income and product accounts.
Christensen and Jorgenson constructed income, product, and wealth ac-
counts, paralleling the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts for
the period 1929–69. They also implemented a vintage accounting system
for the United States on an annual basis. The complete system of vintage
accounts gave stocks of assets of each vintage and their prices. The stocks
were cumulated to obtain asset quantities, providing the perpetual inven-
tory of assets employed by Goldsmith (1955–56, 1962).
The key innovation was the use of asset pricing equations to link the
prices used in evaluating capital stocks and the rental prices employed in
the constant quality index of capital input.7 I nap r e s c i e n tp a p e ro nt h e
measurement of welfare, Samuelson (1961) had suggested that a link be-
tween asset and rental prices was essential for the integration of income
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5. See Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA; 1995).
6. The United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA) is summarized by Stone (1992)
in his Nobel Prize address. The SNA has been revised by the Inter-Secretariat Working
Group on National Accounts (1993).
7. Constant quality price indexes for investment goods of diﬀerent ages or vintages were
developed by Hall (1971). This made it possible for Hulten and Wykoﬀ (1982) to estimate
relative eﬃciencies by age for all types of tangible assets, putting the measurement of capital
consumption required for constant quality index of capital input onto a ﬁrm empirical foun-
dation. The BEA (1995) has adopted this approach in the latest benchmark revision of the
U.S. National Income and Product Accounts, following methodology described by Frau-
meni (1997).and wealth accounting.8 The vintage system of accounts employed the spe-
ciﬁc form of this relationship developed by Jorgenson (1967).
Christensen, Cummings, and Jorgenson (1980) presented annual esti-
mates of sources of economic growth for the United States and its major
trading partners for the period 1960–1973. These estimates included con-
stant quality indexes of capital and labor input for each country. Chris-
tensen, Cummings, and Jorgenson (1981) gave relative levels of output,
input, and productivity for these same countries for the period 1960–1973,
also based on constant quality indexes. Our ﬁrst objective in this paper is
to extend these estimates to 1995 for the G7 countries.9 We have chosen
GDP as a measure of output. We include imputations for the services of
consumers’ durables as well as land, buildings, and equipment owned by
nonproﬁt institutions in order to preserve comparability in the treatment
of income from diﬀerent types of capital.
Our constant quality index of capital input is based on a disaggregation
of the capital stock among the categories given in table 12.1, classiﬁed by
asset type and ownership in order to reﬂect diﬀerences in capital consump-
tion and tax treatment among assets. We derive estimates of capital stock
and property income for each type of capital input from national account-
ing data. Similarly, our constant quality index of labor input is based on a
disaggregation of the work force among the categories presented in table
12.2, classiﬁed by sex, educational attainment, and employment status.
For each country we derive estimates of hours worked and labor compen-
sation for each type of labor input from labor force surveys.
12.3 Sources of Growth
In table 12.3 we present output per capita annually for the G7 countries
over the period 1960–95, expressed relative to the United States in 1985.
Table 12.1 Disaggregation of Capital by Asset Characteristics
Asset Type Ownership Sector
1. Equipment 1. Corporations and government
2. Nonresidential structures 2. Unincorporated businesses
3. Residential structures 3. Households and nonproﬁt institutions





8. See Samuelson (1961), especially p. 309.
9. Dougherty and Jorgenson (1996, 1997) have updated the estimates of Christensen,
Cummings, and Jorgenson (1980, 1981) through 1989.
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12.4 and tables 12.5. We use 1985 purchasing power parities (PPPs) from
the OECD (1987) to convert quantities of output per capita from domestic
currencies for each country into U.S. dollars. The United States was the
leader in per capita output throughout the period, and Canada ranked
second for most of the period. Among the remaining ﬁve countries the
United Kingdom started at the top and Japan at the bottom; by 1995 these
roles were interchanged with Japan overtaking all four European countries
and the United Kingdom lagging behind France and Germany.
In table 12.3 we present input per capita annually for the G7 countries
over the period 1960–95, relative to U.S. input per capita in 1985. We ex-
press quantities of input per capita in U.S. dollars, using PPPs constructed
Table 12.3 Levels of Output and Input per Capita and Productivity (U.S.  100.0 in 1985)
United United
States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Output per Capita
1960 55.6 43.1 37.5 29.2 32.9 22.7 17.3
1973 80.9 65.4 53.6 50.9 53.6 41.4 54.0
1989 109.7 96.7 70.8 70.6 75.6 63.7 83.3
1995 116.3 94.6 72.6 74.6 83.5 69.2 92.8
Input per Capita
1960 70.2 55.6 53.0 42.5 61.7 44.8 50.1
1973 85.6 69.4 60.1 56.3 72.5 49.7 68.6
1989 108.0 98.8 71.7 63.3 88.5 73.2 96.7
1995 112.5 100.1 77.5 68.7 98.5 80.1 106.7
Productivity
1960 79.2 77.5 70.9 68.8 53.4 50.7 34.5
1973 94.5 94.3 89.1 90.5 73.9 83.3 78.7
1989 101.6 97.9 98.8 111.5 85.4 87.0 86.1
1995 103.4 94.5 93.7 108.6 84.8 86.5 87.0
Table 12.2 Disaggregation of Labor by Demographic Characteristics
Sex:
Educational Attainment:
1. One to eight years grade school
2. One to three years secondary school
3. Completed secondary school
4. One to three years college
5. Four or more years of college
Employment Status:
1. Business sector employee
2. Self-employed or unpaid family worker
3. General government employee
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United United
States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Growth Rate (percentage)
1960–73 1.22 1.79 0.54 1.01 0.86 0.67 1.18
1973–89 1.00 1.22 0.01 0.47 0.17 0.45 1.07
1973–95 0.94 1.20 0.20 0.51 0.11 0.22 0.61
1989–95 1.03 1.31 0.36 0.57 0.79 0.07 0.33
1960–89 1.08 1.47 0.31 0.73 0.39 0.47 0.96
1960–95 1.07 1.44 0.32 0.70 0.46 0.38 0.85
Level
1960 180.8 17.9 52.4 45.7 55.4 50.2 93.3
1973 211.9 22.6 56.2 52.1 62.0 54.8 108.7
1989 247.3 27.4 57.4 56.4 62.1 57.5 123.1
1995 263.2 29.6 58.6 58.4 65.1 57.3 125.6
Level (U.S.  100.0 in 1985)
1960 75.8 7.5 22.0 19.2 23.2 21.1 39.1
1973 88.9 9.5 23.6 21.9 26.0 23.0 45.6
1989 100.0 10.9 23.8 23.2 25.6 24.0 50.6
1995 110.4 12.4 24.6 24.5 27.3 24.0 52.7
Table 12.4 Growth Rate and Level in Output
United United
States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Growth Rate (percentage)
1960–73 4.11 4.99 3.28 5.28 4.60 5.29 9.95
1973–89 2.94 4.79 1.40 2.97 2.67 4.36 3.79
1973–95 2.83 2.98 2.15 2.28 1.85 2.18 3.31
1989–95 2.00 0.94 0.78 1.49 2.45 1.32 2.14
1960–89 3.43 4.26 2.50 3.77 3.25 4.03 6.39
1960–95 3.18 3.69 2.21 3.38 3.12 3.56 5.66
Level (billions of 1985 U.S. dollars)
1960 1,826 140 357 243 332 207 292
1973 3,115 268 547 482 603 412 1,066
1989 4,930 481 738 724 852 666 1,863
1995 5,560 509 773 791 987 721 2,118
Level (U.S.  100.0 in 1985)
1960 42.1 3.2 8.2 5.6 7.7 4.8 6.7
1973 71.9 6.2 12.6 11.1 13.9 9.5 24.6
1989 113.8 11.1 17.0 16.7 19.7 15.4 43.0
1995 128.3 11.7 17.8 18.3 22.8 16.6 48.9for this study.10 The United States was the leader in per capita input as
well as output throughout the period. Germany started in second place
but lost its position to Canada in 1975 and Japan in 1976. In 1995 Japan
ranked next to the United States in input per capita with Canada third.
France started at the bottom of the ranking and remained there for most
of the period. Canada, France, Italy, and Japan grew relative to the United
States, whereas Germany and the United Kingdom declined.
In table 12.3 we present productivity levels annually for the G7 countries
over the period 1960–95, where productivity is deﬁned as the ratio of out-
put to input. In 1960 the United States was the productivity leader with
Canada closely behind. In 1970 Canada became the ﬁrst country to over-
take the United States, remaining slightly above the U.S. level for most of
the period ending in 1984. France surpassed the U.S. in 1979 and became
the international productivity leader after 1980. The United Kingdom
overtook Canada and nearly overtook the United States in 1987, but fell
behind both countries in 1990. Japan surpassed Germany in 1970 and
Italy in 1990, and Italy overtook Germany in 1963 and maintained its lead
during most of the period ending in 1995.
We summarize growth in output and input per capita and productivity
for the G7 countries in table 12.6. (For completeness we present growth
rates of output and population separately in tables 12.4 and 12.5.) We
present annual average growth rates for the period 1960–95 and the sub-
periods 1960–73, 1973–89, and 1989–95. Japan was the leader in output
growth for the period as a whole and before 1973. The United Kingdom
grew more slowly than the remaining six countries during the period as a
whole and after 1960. Output growth slowed in all the G7 countries after
1989, and Canada’s growth rate was negative. Diﬀerences in growth rates
among the G7 countries declined substantially after 1973.
Japan also led the G7 in growth of input per capita for the period
1960–95 and before 1973. Italy was the leader during the subperiod 1973–
89, and Germany led during 1989–95. There is little evidence of a slow-
down in input growth after 1973; diﬀerences among input growth rates are
much less than among output growth rates. Japan led the G7 in productiv-
ity growth for the period as a whole and before 1973, whereas France was
the leader from 1973 to 1989. All the G7 countries—with the exception of
Japan and the United States—experienced negative productivity growth
after 1989. The United States had a slightly higher productivity growth
rate than Japan during this period. In table 12.3 we present levels of output
and input per capita and productivity relative to the U.S. level in 1985.
Our constant quality index of capital input weights capital stocks for
each of the categories given in table 12.1 by rental prices, deﬁn e da sp r o p -
erty compensation per unit of capital. By contrast, an index of capital
10. Our methodology is described in detail by Dougherty (1992).
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rental prices appropriate for capital input. The ratio of capital input to
capital stock measures the average quality of a unit of capital, as reﬂected
in its marginal product. This enables us to assess the magnitude of diﬀer-
ences between the constant quality index of capital input and the un-
weighted index of capital stock employed by Kuznets (1971) and Solow
(1970).
In table 12.7 we present capital input per capita annually for the G7
countries over the period 1960–95, expressed relative to the United States
in 1985. The United States was the leader in capital input per capita
through 1991, when Canada overtook the United States and emerged as
the international leader. All countries grew substantially relative to the
United States, but only Canada surpassed the U.S. level. Germany led the
remaining ﬁve countries throughout the period, and the United Kingdom
was the laggard among these countries, except for the period 1962–73,
when Japan ranked lower.
The picture for capital stock per capita has some similarities to capital
input, but there are important diﬀerences. The United States led through-
out the period in capital stock, whereas Canada overtook the United
Table 12.6 Growth in Output and Input per Capita and Productivity (percentage)
United United
States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Output per Capita
1960–73 2.89 3.20 2.74 4.26 3.74 4.62 8.77
1973–89 1.90 2.45 1.75 2.04 2.15 2.69 2.71
1973–95 1.65 1.68 1.38 1.74 2.02 2.34 2.46
1989–95 0.97 0.37 0.42 0.92 1.66 1.40 1.81
1960–89 2.34 2.79 2.19 3.04 2.86 3.56 5.43
1960–95 2.11 2.24 1.89 2.68 2.66 3.19 4.81
Input per Capita
1960–73 1.53 1.70 0.98 2.15 1.24 0.79 2.42
1973–89 1.45 2.21 1.10 0.74 1.25 2.42 2.15
1973–95 1.24 1.67 1.15 0.91 1.39 2.17 2.01
1989–95 0.68 0.21 1.30 1.37 1.78 1.49 1.63
1960–89 1.49 1.98 1.04 1.37 1.25 1.69 2.27
1960–95 1.35 1.68 1.09 1.37 1.34 1.66 2.16
Productivity
1960–73 1.36 1.51 1.76 2.11 2.50 3.82 6.35
1973–89 0.45 0.23 0.65 1.31 0.90 0.27 0.56
1973–95 0.41 0.01 0.23 0.83 0.62 0.17 0.45
1989–95 0.29 0.59 0.88 0.45 0.11 0.10 0.18
1960–89 0.86 0.80 1.15 1.67 1.62 1.86 3.16
1960–95 0.76 0.57 0.80 1.30 1.32 1.53 2.65
520 Dale W. Jorgenson and Eric YipStates in capital input. France, Germany, and Italy had similar stock lev-
els throughout the period with Italy leading this group of three countries
in 1995. Similarly, Japan and the United Kingdom had similar levels
throughout the period; Japan ranked last until 1976 but surpassed the
United Kingdom in that year. Capital stock levels do not accurately reﬂect
the substitutions among capital inputs that accompany investments in tan-
gible assets.
Capital quality is the ratio of capital input to capital stock. The behavior
of capital quality highlights the diﬀerences between the constant quality
index of capital input and capital stock. Germany was the international
leader in capital quality throughout most of the period 1960–95, and the
United States ranked at the bottom. There are important changes in capi-
tal quality over time and persistent diﬀerences among countries. Heteroge-
neity of capital input within each country and between countries must be
taken into account in international comparisons of economic performance.
We summarize growth in capital input and capital stock per capita and
capita quality for the G7 countries in table 12.8. Italy was the international
leader in capital input growth, and the United States was the laggard for
the period 1960–95. There was a modest slowdown in capital input growth
after 1973 and again after 1989 as well as similar slowdowns in capital
stock growth. Italy was the leader in capital quality growth, and Japan
was the laggard. In table 12.7 we present levels of capital input and capital
stock per capita and capital quality relative to the United States in 1985.
Our constant quality index of labor input weights hours worked for each
Table 12.7 Levels of Capital Input and Capital Stock per Capita and Capital Quality (U.S. 
100.0 in 1985)
United United
States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Capital Input per Capita
1960 58.5 41.7 21.0 24.0 26.0 17.1 21.6
1973 79.0 61.9 32.4 46.8 56.6 38.4 31.6
1989 109.4 106.7 52.6 76.4 91.9 80.7 56.4
1995 114.3 119.2 60.4 87.1 108.5 97.3 68.3
Capital Stock per Capita
1960 68.2 43.3 18.8 18.8 20.1 19.6 17.3
1973 85.8 60.3 28.0 38.1 41.3 37.5 25.4
1989 105.3 93.3 42.9 63.4 62.9 65.9 47.8
1995 109.4 98.5 48.2 71.8 74.9 79.6 58.7
Capital Quality
1960 85.8 96.3 111.8 127.2 129.1 87.6 124.7
1973 92.1 102.7 116.1 122.8 137.1 102.2 124.1
1989 103.9 114.3 122.7 120.6 146.1 122.5 118.0
1995 104.5 121.0 125.2 121.3 144.8 122.2 116.3
Whatever Happened to Productivity Growth? 521of the categories given in table 12.2 by wage rates deﬁned in terms of labor
compensation per hour. An index of hours worked adds together diﬀerent
types of hours without taking quality diﬀerences into account. The ratio
of labor input to hours worked measures the average quality of an hour of
labor, as reﬂected in its marginal product. This enables us to assess the
magnitude of diﬀerences between the constant quality index of labor input
and the unweighted index of hours worked employed by Kuznets (1971)
and Solow (1970).
In table 12.9 we present labor input per capita annually for the G7 coun-
tries for the period 1960–95, relative to the United States in 1985. The
United Kingdom led until 1962 but was overtaken by Japan in that year.
The United States surpassed the United Kingdom in 1977, but the two
countries grew in parallel through 1995 with the United States maintaining
a slight lead over most of the period. France ranked at the bottom of the
G7 for most of the period but led Italy from 1965 to 1979. Japan remained
the international leader through 1995 with levels of labor input more than
one-third of the United States and the United Kingdom and more than
double that of France.
The picture for hours worked per capita has some similarities to labor
Table 12.8 Growth in Capital Input and Capital Stock per Capita and Capital
Quality (percentage)
United United
States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Capital Input per Capita
1960–73 2.32 3.03 3.34 5.15 6.00 6.20 2.93
1973–89 2.03 3.40 3.02 3.06 3.02 4.65 3.63
1973–95 1.68 2.98 2.82 2.82 2.95 4.23 3.51
1989–95 0.74 1.85 2.29 2.19 2.77 3.12 3.18
1960–89 2.16 3.24 3.17 4.00 4.36 5.34 3.32
1960–95 1.92 3.00 3.02 3.69 4.09 4.96 3.29
Capital Stock per Capita
1960–73 1.77 2.54 3.06 5.42 5.54 5.01 2.97
1973–89 1.28 2.73 2.68 3.17 2.63 3.52 3.94
1973–95 1.11 2.23 2.48 2.88 2.71 3.42 3.80
1989–95 0.64 0.91 1.94 2.08 2.92 3.15 3.42
1960–89 1.50 2.65 2.85 4.18 3.93 4.18 3.51
1960–95 1.35 2.35 2.69 3.82 3.76 4.01 3.49
Capital Quality
1960–73 0.55 0.49 0.29 0.27 0.46 1.19 0.04
1973–89 0.75 0.67 0.35 0.11 0.40 1.13 0.32
1973–95 0.57 0.75 0.35 0.05 0.25 0.81 0.30
1989–95 0.09 0.95 0.34 0.10 0.15 0.03 0.24
1960–89 0.66 0.59 0.32 0.18 0.43 1.16 0.19
1960–95 0.56 0.65 0.32 0.14 0.33 0.95 0.20
522 Dale W. Jorgenson and Eric Yipinput, but there are important diﬀerences. Japan was the international
leader in hours worked per capita throughout the period, and Germany
led the four European countries for most of the period. The United States
overtook France in 1975 and Germany and the United Kingdom in 1977.
At the beginning of the period Canada ranked last but lost this position
to Italy in 1965. Italy was the laggard in hours worked until 1983, when
France fell to the bottom of the G7, remaining there through 1995. Hours
worked do not accurately reﬂect the substitutions among labor inputs that
accompany investments in human capital.
Labor quality is the ratio of the constant quality index of labor input
to the unweighted index of hours worked. The behavior of labor quality
highlights the diﬀerences between labor input and hours worked. Canada,
the United States, and the United Kingdom were the leaders in labor qual-
ity; labor quality in these three countries grew in parallel through 1995.
France was the laggard among G7 countries in labor quality throughout
most of the period 1960–95. There are important changes in labor quality
over time and persistent diﬀerences among countries. Heterogeneity
within each country and between countries must be taken into account in
international comparisons of economic growth.
We summarize growth in labor input and hours worked per capita and
labor quality in table 12.10. Japan led the G7 countries in labor input
growth for the period 1960–95 and before 1973. Canada was the interna-
tional leader during the subperiod 1973–89, and Germany was the leader
after 1989. The United States led growth in hours worked for the period
as a whole and after 1989, and Japan was the leader before 1973, and Italy
Table 12.9 Levels of Labor Input and Hours Worked per Capita and Labor Quality (U.S. 
100.0 in 1985)
United United
States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Labor Input per Capita
1960 77.8 69.0 95.5 60.5 98.6 66.6 91.2
1973 89.1 75.4 89.8 63.0 84.3 56.6 117.7
1989 107.0 93.0 89.3 55.2 86.1 68.7 141.0
1995 111.1 87.5 93.7 57.5 90.8 70.2 146.2
Hours Worked per Capita
1960 91.1 80.4 110.2 105.0 120.4 89.2 134.4
1973 95.5 83.7 96.6 97.4 98.7 74.6 145.3
1989 104.5 93.4 92.7 77.8 93.5 85.5 150.2
1995 105.3 84.3 92.6 74.2 95.4 84.2 152.1
Labor Quality
1960 85.4 85.8 86.7 57.7 81.9 74.7 67.9
1973 93.3 90.1 92.9 64.7 85.4 75.9 81.0
1989 102.4 99.6 96.4 71.0 92.0 80.3 93.9
1995 105.5 103.8 101.3 77.5 95.2 83.4 96.1
Whatever Happened to Productivity Growth? 523led between 1973 to 1989. Growth was positive throughout the period
for Japan and the United States, mostly negative for the four European
countries, and alternately positive and negative for Canada. Growth in
labor quality was positive for all seven countries with a modest decline
after 1973 and a revival after 1989. In table 12.9 we present labor input
and hours worked per capita and labor quality relative to the U.S. in 1985.
Using data from table 12.6, we can assess the relative importance of
investment and productivity in per capita growth for the G7 countries.
For Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, investments in
tangible assets and human capital greatly predominated as sources of
growth over the period 1960–95. We can attribute slightly more than half
of Japanese growth to productivity, whereas proportions for the four Euro-
pean countries—France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom—are
slightly less than half. After 1973 growth in output and productivity de-
clined for all seven countries; however, growth in input has not declined,
so the relative importance of productivity has sharply diminished.
Similarly, using data from table 12.8 we can combine estimates of
growth in capital input, capital stock, and capital quality to assess the
Table 12.10 Growth in Labor Input and Hours Worked per Capita and Labor
Quality (percentage)
United United
States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Labor Input per Capita
1960–73 1.05 0.69 0.48 0.31 1.20 1.25 1.96
1973–89 1.14 1.31 0.03 0.82 0.13 1.21 1.13
1973–95 1.00 0.68 0.20 0.41 0.34 0.97 0.98
1989–95 0.64 1.01 0.80 0.68 0.90 0.34 0.60
1960–89 1.10 1.03 0.23 0.32 0.47 0.11 1.50
1960–95 1.02 0.68 0.05 0.14 0.23 0.15 1.35
Hours Worked per Capita
1960–73 0.37 0.31 1.01 0.57 1.53 1.38 0.60
1973–89 0.56 0.69 0.26 1.41 0.34 0.86 0.21
1973–95 0.44 0.03 0.20 1.24 0.16 0.55 0.21
1989–95 0.13 1.70 0.02 0.79 0.34 0.27 0.21
1960–89 0.47 0.52 0.60 1.03 0.87 0.15 0.38
1960–95 0.42 0.14 0.50 0.99 0.67 0.17 0.35
Labor Quality
1960–73 0.68 0.38 0.53 0.88 0.32 0.13 1.36
1973–89 0.58 0.62 0.23 0.58 0.47 0.35 0.92
1973–95 0.56 0.64 0.39 0.83 0.50 0.42 0.78
1989–95 0.50 0.70 0.82 1.47 0.56 0.62 0.39
1960–89 0.62 0.51 0.37 0.72 0.40 0.25 1.12
1960–95 0.60 0.55 0.44 0.85 0.43 0.31 0.99
524 Dale W. Jorgenson and Eric Yipimportance of changes in quality. Capital input growth is positive for all
countries for the period 1960–95 and all three subperiods. Capital quality
growth is positive for the period as a whole for all G7 countries, except
France and Japan. Although capital stock greatly predominates in capital
input growth, capital quality is quantitatively signiﬁcant, so that the het-
erogeneity of capital must be taken into account in assessing the role of
investment in tangible assets.
Finally, using data from table 12.10 we can combine estimates of growth
in labor input, hours worked, and labor quality to assess the importance
of hours and quality. Labor input growth is negative for the period
1960–95 in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom and is slightly pos-
itive for Italy. Growth in hours worked is mostly negative for all four coun-
tries throughout the period. However, growth in labor quality has helped
to oﬀset the decline in hours worked in Europe. For Canada, Japan, and
the United States, labor quality predominates in the growth of labor input,
so that the heterogeneity of labor input is essential in assessing the role of
investment in human capital.
12.4 Convergence
The objective of modeling economic growth is to explain the sources
and uses of growth endogenously. National income is the starting point for
assessments of the uses of growth through consumption and saving. The
concept of a measure of economic welfare, introduced by Nordhaus and
Tobin (1972), is the key to augmenting national income to broaden the
concepts of consumption and saving. Similarly, GDP is the starting point
for attributing the sources of economic growth to growth in productivity
and investments in tangible assets and human capital.
Denison (1967) compared diﬀerences in growth rates for national in-
come per person employed for the period 1950–62 with diﬀe r e n c e so fl e v -
els in 1960 for eight European countries and the United States. However,
he overlooked the separate roles for a production account with the national
product and inputs of capital and labor services and an income and expen-
diture account with national income, consumption, and saving. From an
economic point of view this ignored the distinction between the sources
and uses of economic growth.
Denison compared diﬀerences in both growth rates and levels of na-
tional income per person employed. The eight European countries as a
whole were characterized by more rapid growth and a lower level of na-
tional income per capita. Although this association was not monotonic for
comparisons between individual countries and the United States, Denison
concluded that11
11. See Denison (1967), especially Chapter 21, “The Sources of Growth and the Contrast
between Europe and the United States,” pp. 296–348.
Whatever Happened to Productivity Growth? 525Aside from short-term aberrations Europe should be able to report
higher growth rates, at least in national income per person employed,
for a long time. Americans should expect this and not be disturbed by it.
Kuznets (1971) provided elaborate comparisons of growth rates for the
fourteen countries included in his study. Unlike Denison (1967), he did not
provide level comparisons. Maddison (1982) ﬁlled this gap by comparing
levels of national product for sixteen countries12 on the basis of estimates
of PPPs by Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1978).13 These estimates have
been updated by successive versions of the Penn World Table and made it
possible to reconsider the issue of convergence of output per capita raised
by Denison (1967).14
Abramovitz (1986) was the ﬁrst to take up the challenge of analyzing
convergence of output per capita among Maddison’s sixteen countries. He
found that convergence appeared to characterize output levels in the post-
war period, but not the period before 1914 and the interwar period. Bau-
mol (1986) formalized these results by running a regression of growth rate
of GDP per hour worked over the period 1870–1979 on the 1870 level of
GDP per hour worked.15 A negative regression coeﬃcient is evidence for
beta-convergence of GDP levels.
In a notable paper titled “Crazy Explanations for the Productivity Slow-
down,” Romer (1987) derived a version of the growth regression from So-
low’s (1970) growth model with a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Romer also extended the data set for growth regressions from Maddison’s
(1982) group of sixteen advanced countries to the 115 countries included
in Penn World Table (Mark 3), presented by Summers and Heston (1984).
Romer’sk e yﬁnding was that an indirect estimate of the Cobb-Douglas
elasticity of output with respect to capital was close to three-quarters. The
share of capital in output implied by Solow’s model was less than half as
great on average.16
12. Maddison added Austria and Finland to Kuznets’ list and presented growth rates cov-
ering periods beginning as early as 1820 and extending through 1979. Maddison (1991, 1995)
has extended these estimates through 1992.
13. For details see Maddison (1982, 159–168). Purchasing power parities were ﬁrst mea-
sured for industrialized countries by Gilbert and Kravis (1954) and Gilbert (1958).
14. A complete list through Mark 5 is given by Summers and Heston (1991), while the
results of Mark 6 are summarized by the World Bank (1994) in the World Development Re-
port 1993.
15. This growth regression has spawned a vast literature, summarized by Levine and Re-
nelt (1992); Baumol (1994); and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1994). Much of this literature has
been based on successive versions of the Penn World Table.
16. Unfortunately, this Mark 3 data set did not include capital input. Romer’s empirical
ﬁnding has spawned a substantial theoretical literature, summarized at an early stage by
Lucas (1988) and, more recently, by Grossman and Helpman (1991, 1994); Romer (1994);
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1994); and Aghion and Howitt (1998). Romer’s own important
contributions to this literature have focused on increasing returns to scale, as in Romer
(1986), and spillovers from technological change, as in Romer (1990).
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cal framework of Kuznets (1971) and Solow (1970). The empirical portion
of their study is based on data for ninety-eight countries from the Penn
World Table (Mark 4), presented by Summers and Heston (1988). Like
Romer (1987), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil derived a growth equation from
the Solow (1970) model; however, they also augmented this model by
allowing for investment in human capital.
The results of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) provided empirical sup-
port for the augmented Solow model. There was clear evidence of the con-
vergence predicted by the model, where convergence was conditional on
the ratio of investment to GDP and the rate of population growth; both
are determinants of steady state output. In addition, the estimated Cobb-
Douglas elasticity of output with respect to capital coincided with the
share of capital in the value of output. However, the rate of convergence of
output per capita was too slow to be consistent with the 1970 version of
the Solow model.
Islam (1995) exploited an important feature of the Summers-Heston
(1988) data overlooked in previous empirical studies, namely, benchmark
comparisons of levels of the national product at ﬁve year intervals, begin-
ning in 1960 and ending in 1985. Using econometric methods for panel
data, Islam tested an assumption maintained in growth regressions, such
as those of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil. Their study, like that of Romer
(1987), assumed identical technologies for all countries included in the
Summers-Heston data sets.
Substantial diﬀerences in levels of productivity among countries have
beendocumentedbyDenison(1967);Christensen,Cummings,andJorgen-
son(1981);andearlierinsection12.2.Byintroducingpaneldatatechniques,
Islam (1995) was able to allow for these diﬀerences. He corroborated
the ﬁnding of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) that the elasticity of out-
put with respect to capital input coincided with the share of capital in the
value of output.
In addition, Islam (1995) found that the rate of convergence of output
per capita among countries in the Summers-Heston (1988) data set was
precisely that required to substantiate the unaugmented version of the So-
low (1970). In short, “crazy explanations” for the productivity slowdown,
like those propounded by Romer (1987, 1994), are not required. Moreover,
the model did not require augmentation, as suggested by Mankiw, Romer,
and Weil (1992). However, diﬀerences in productivity among these coun-
tries must be taken into account in modeling diﬀerences in growth rates.
The conclusion from Islam’s (1995) research is that the Solow model is
the appropriate point of departure for modeling the accumulation of tan-
gible assets. For this purpose it is unnecessary to endogenize investment in
human capital as well. The rationale for this key empirical ﬁnding is that
the transition path to balanced growth equilibrium requires decades after
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policies. By contrast, the transition after changes in policies aﬀecting in-
vestment in human capital requires as much as a century.
In ﬁgure 12.1 we present coeﬃcients of variation for levels of output
and input per capita and productivity for the G7 countries annually for
the period 1960–95. The coeﬃcients for output decline by almost a fac-
tor of two between 1960 and 1974 but then remain stable throughout the
rest of the period. Coeﬃcients for productivity decline by more than a fac-
tor of two between 1960 and 1970 and then stabilize. Coeﬃcients for input
per capita are nearly unchanged throughout the period. This is evidence
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Fig. 12.1 Convergence of output and input per capita and productivityfor the sigma-convergence of output and input per capita and productivity
implied by Solow’s neoclassical theory of growth, allowing for diﬀerences
in productivity of the type identiﬁed by Islam.
Figure 12.2 presents coeﬃcients of variation for levels of capital input
and capital stock per capita and capital quality for the G7 countries. The
coeﬃcients for capital input decline gradually throughout the period. Co-
eﬃcients for capital stock are slightly larger than those for capital input
but behave in a similar manner. Coeﬃcients for capital quality are stable
until 1968 and then decline to a slightly lower level after 1971. This is also
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Fig. 12.2 Convergence of capital input, capital stock per capita, and
capital qualityevidence of the sigma-convergence implied by Solow’s growth model with
persistent diﬀerences in levels of capital quality among countries.
Finally, coeﬃcients of variation for levels of labor input and hours
worked per capita and labor quality for the G7 are given in ﬁgure 12.3.
The coeﬃcients for labor input rise gradually. The coeﬃcients for hours
worked rise gradually until 1973 and then stabilize for most of the period.
The coeﬃcients for labor quality gradually decline. Again, this is evidence
for sigma-convergence with persistent international diﬀe r e n c e si nl a b o r
quality.
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Fig. 12.3 Convergence of labor input, hours worked per capita, and
labor qualityThe evidence of sigma-convergence among the G7 countries presented
in ﬁgures 12.1, 12.2, and 12.3 is consistent with a new version of the neo-
classical growth model, characterized by persistent but stable international
diﬀerences in productivity, capital quality, labor quality, and hours worked
per capita. Islam showed that a simpler version of the model with constant
diﬀerences in productivity among countries successfully rationalizes dif-
ferences in growth of per capita output among a much broader group of
countries over the period 1960–85.
12.5 Endogenizing Growth
Investment is endogenous in a neoclassical growth model, whereas pro-
ductivity is exogenous. Solow’s (1957) deﬁnition of investment was limited
to tangible assets. In order to increase the explanatory power of growth
theory, it is necessary to broaden the concept of investment to include hu-
man capital. The mechanism by which investments in education and train-
ing are translated into economic growth is well understood. An increase
in the supply of more highly educated or trained individuals generates a
stream of labor income that represents a return to investment in human
capital that can be internalized by the investor.
Constant quality indexes of labor input are an essential prerequisite for
incorporating human capital into an empirical model of economic growth.
The marginal products of workers with diﬀerent levels of education and
training are used to weight the corresponding hours of work. Jorgenson
and Fraumeni (1989) have broadened the vintage accounting system devel-
oped by Christensen and Jorgenson (1973) to include investments in hu-
man capital. The essential idea is to treat individual members of the U.S.
population as human assets with asset prices given by their lifetime labor
incomes. Jorgenson and Fraumeni have implemented the vintage account-
ing system for both human and nonhuman capital for the United States
on an annual basis for the period 1948–84.
In a vintage accounting system for human capital, wage rates corre-
spond to marginal products and can be observed directly from the labor
market. Lifetime labor incomes play the role of asset prices in accounting
for human wealth. These incomes are derived by applying asset pricing
equations to future wage rates, discounting them back to the present. Asset
prices for tangible assets can be observed directly in markets for invest-
ment goods; asset pricing equations are used to derive rental prices for
capital services. These rental prices are the marginal products of tangible
capital assets.
Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1992b) have developed a measure of the out-
put of the U.S. education sector. Although education is a service industry,
its output is investment in human capital. Investment in education can be
measured from the impact of increases in educational attainment on life-
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measured in this way, is similar in magnitude to the value of working time
for all individuals in the labor force.
Second, Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1992a) have measured the inputs of
the education sector, beginning with the purchased inputs by educational
institutions. Most of the value of the output of educational institutions ac-
crues to students through increases in their lifetime incomes. Student time
is the most important input into the educational process. Given the outlays
of educational institutions and the value of student time, the growth of the
education sector can be allocated to its sources.
An alternative approach, employed by Schultz (1961), Machlup (1962),
Nordhaus and Tobin (1972), and many others, is to apply Goldsmith’s
(1955–56) perpetual inventory method to private and public expenditures
on educational services. Unfortunately, the approach has foundered on the
absence of a satisfactory measure of the output of the educational sector
and the lack of an obvious rationale for capital consumption.17
Given vintage accounts for human and nonhuman capital, Jorgenson
and Fraumeni (1989) constructed a system of income, product, and wealth
accounts, paralleling the system Jorgenson had developed with Christen-
sen. In these accounts the value of human wealth was more than ten times
the value of nonhuman wealth, whereas investment in human capital was
ﬁve times investment in tangible assets. Full investment in the U.S. econ-
omy is deﬁned as the sum of these two types of investment. Similarly,
the value of nonmarket labor activities is added to personal consumption
expenditures to obtain full consumption. The product measure included
these new measures of investment and consumption.
Because the complete accounting system included a production account
with full measures of capital and labor inputs,18 Jorgenson and Fraumeni
were able to generate a new set of accounts for the sources of U.S. eco-
nomic growth. The system also included an income and expenditure ac-
count with income from labor services in both market and nonmarket ac-
tivities and an allocation of full income between consumption and saving.
This provided the basis for the uses of U.S. economic growth and a new
measure of economic welfare. The system was completed by a wealth ac-
count containing both human wealth and tangible assets.
Jorgenson and Fraumeni aggregated the growth of education and non-
education sectors of the U.S. economy to obtain a new measure of U.S.
economic growth. Combining this with measures of input growth, they ob-
tained a new set of accounts for the sources of growth. Productivity con-
tributes almost nothing to the growth of the education sector and only a
modest proportion to output growth for the economy as a whole, so that
productivity accounts for only 17 percent of growth.
17. For more detailed discussion, see Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989).
18. Our terminology follows that of Becker’s (1965, 1993) theory of time allocation.
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explanatory power of the theory of economic growth to 83 percent. How-
ever, it is important to emphasize that growth is measured diﬀerently. The
traditional framework for economic measurement of Kuznets (1971) and
Solow (1970) excludes nonmarket activities, such as those that characterize
the major portion of investment in education. The intuition is familiar to
any teacher, including teachers of economics: What the students do is far
more important than what the teachers do, even if the subject matter is the
theory of economic growth.
A third approximation to the theory of economic growth results from
incorporating all forms of investment in human capital, including educa-
tion, child rearing, and addition of new members to the population. Fertil-
ity could be made endogenous by using the approach of Barro and Becker
(1988) and Becker and Barro (1988). Child rearing could be made endoge-
nous by modeling the household as a producing sector along the lines of
the model of the educational sector just outlined. The results presented by
Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989) show that this would endogenize 86 per-
cent of U.S. economic growth. This is a signiﬁcant, but not overwhelming,
gain in explanatory power.
In principle, investment in new technology could be made endogenous
within a neoclassical growth model by extending the concept of investment
to encompass intellectual capital. For example, the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA; 1994) has provided a satellite system of accounts for re-
search and development, based on Goldsmith’s (1955–56) perpetual inven-
tory method, applied to private and public expenditures. Unfortunately,
this is subject to the same limitations as is the approach to human capital
of Schultz (1961) and Machlup (1962). The BEA satellite system has foun-
dered on the absence of a satisfactory measure of the output of R&D and
the lack of an appropriate rationale for capital consumption.
The standard model for investment in new technology, formulated by
Griliches (1973), is based on a production function incorporating inputs of
services from intellectual capital accumulated through R&D investment.
Intellectual capital is treated as a factor of production in precisely the
same way as are tangible assets in section 12.2. Hall (1993) has developed
the implications of this model for the pricing of the services of intellectual
capital input and the evaluation of intellectual capital assets.
The model of capital as a factor of production ﬁrst propounded by Jor-
genson (1963) has been successfully applied to tangible assets and human
capital. However, implementation for intellectual capital would require a
system of vintage accounts including not only accumulation equations for
stocks of accumulated R&D but also asset pricing equations. These equa-
tions are essential for separating the revaluation of intellectual property
due to price changes over time from depreciation of this property due to
aging. This is required for measuring the quantity of intellectual capital
input and its marginal product.
Whatever Happened to Productivity Growth? 533The disappearance of productivity growth in the G7 countries docu-
mented in this paper is a serious challenge for theories of growth based on
externalities, like those of Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986, 1990). These
theories rest on spillovers of beneﬁts that appear as productivity growth
within a classiﬁcation of the sources of economic growth. Externalities
have become relatively less important during the period of our study. This
has increased, not reduced, the explanatory power of the new version of
the neoclassical theory of economic growth that we have outlined.
At this point the identiﬁcation of the externalities that have contributed
to past economic growth in the G7 countries is only a matter for specula-
tion. However, a broader concept of investment is urgently required as
a guide for a forward-looking growth strategy. Government policies for
channeling externalities must be replaced by assignments of property
rights and the design of appropriate price systems for decentralizing in-
vestment decisions among participants in the private sector. This strategy
will require careful attention to the incentives facing investors in tangible




Data on nominal and real Canadian GDP, general government output,
and subsidies are available in the National Income and Expenditure Ac-
counts (NIEA) from Statistics Canada. Labor hours and employment are
available from a number of sources, including the Census, Labor Force
Survey, the Input-Output Division, and the Labor Force Historical Re-
view. The labor compensation shares by sex and educational attainment
are calculated by using data of wage and salary income per employed per-
son for Census years; non-Census years estimates are obtained by interpo-
lation. Capital stock data are available in the NIEA and the Financial
Flows Section of National Balance Sheet Accounts.
France
Data on nominal and real GDP, general government output, indirect
taxes, and subsidies are available in De Compte Nationaux, Le Mouve-
ment Economique en France (for 1949–79), and Compte et Indicateurs
Economiques 1996, published by Institut National de la Statistique et des
Etudes Economiques (INSEE). Data on employment by sex and educa-
tional attainment level are available in the annual Enquete de l’Emploi and
Population Active, Emploi et Chomage Depuis 30 Ans, both published by
534 Dale W. Jorgenson and Eric YipINSEE. Data on average workweeks and weekly hours worked by sex and
employment status are again available in Eurostats Labour Force Sample
Survey for earlier years, and upon special request from Eurostats for 1985
onwards. French Economic Growth by Carre, Dubois, and Malinvaud
provides data on annual hours worked in the 1960s. As for labor compen-
sation shares, the French Survey of Employment, the Enquete sur la For-
mation et la Qualiﬁcation Professionnelle, De Compte Nationaux, Le
Mouvement Economique en France contains data on wages and salaries
for various categories. French capital stock data can be obtained from
INSEE publication Comptes de Patrimoine, De Compte Nationaux,
Comptes et Indicateurs Economiques and the OECD National Accounts,
volume 2. Consumer durable expenditure can be obtained in a separate
account, the INSEE publication La Consommation des Menages.
Germany
Data on nominal and real GDP, general government output, indirect
taxes, and subsidies are available in the Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrech-
nungen (VGR) and Statistisches Jahrbuch. Employment data can be ob-
tained from VGR, Beruf Aubildung und Arbeitsbedingungen (for some
recent years), Wirtschaft und Statistik, and Stand und Entwicklung der
Erwerbstatigkeit, which contains the annual results of the German Micro-
census, a household survey similar to the U.S. Current Population Survey.
Labor income data are available through the Luxembourg Income Study
(LIS). Most capital stock series can be found in VGR, whereas consumer
durable expenditure on various categories are obtained in Einkommens
und Verbrauchsstichprobe and the Laufende Wirtschaftsrechnungen.
Italy
Data on nominal and real GDP, general government output, indirect
taxes, and subsidies are available in the Annuario di Contabilita Nazionale
and the Conti Economici Nazionali. Employment data are available in
Statistiche del Lavoro and the Rilevazione delle Forze di Lavoro. Labor
hours can also be found in the Rilevazione di Lavoro, which provides data
as well as from the Eurostats. The census publication Censimenti contains
employment and hours data in ﬁve categories for the years 1961, 1971,
1981 and 1991. Labor compensation data are again obtained from the LIS.
Capital stock data are available through the Italian business association,
Conﬁndustria, in a study carried out by Alberto Heimler; Gennaro Zezza
of the Centro Studi Conﬁndustria supplied estimates of total business in-
ventories in 1985 prices.
Japan
Data on nominal and real GDP, general government output, indirect
taxes, and subsidies are available from the National Economic Accounts,
Whatever Happened to Productivity Growth? 535published by the Economic Planning Agency. The sources of data for the
number of workers and employees are the Population Census of Japan,
Report on the Labor Force Survey, and the Basic Survey on Wage Struc-
tures. Masahiro Kuroda of Keio University supplied the capital stock
data.
United Kingdom
Data on nominal and real GDP, general government output, indirect
taxes, and subsidies are available in the Blue Book published by the Cen-
tral Statistical Oﬃce (CSO). Employment by sex and employment status
are available in the Employment Gazette, Historical Supplement No. 2,
and Employment and Earning, published by the U.K. Department of Em-
ployment, and by special request from Quantime, a subsidiary of SPSS.
Data on total general government employment are available in Economic
Trends, published by CSO. Data on average workweeks and weekly hours
worked by sex and employment status are available in Eurostats Labour
Force Sample Survey for earlier years and upon special request from Eu-
rostats for 1985 onwards. General Household Survey provides data in la-
bor income that can be used in calculating labor shares. Capital stock data
are available in the Blue Book with the exception of data on land, which
is taken from Annual Abstract of Statistics and Inland Revenue Statistics.
United States
Data on nominal and real GDP, general government output, indirect
taxes, and subsidies are available in the U.S. National Income and Product
Accounts, published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Labor hours
and employment are available from the Census of Population and the Cur-
rent Population Survey, published by the Bureau of the Census. The labor
compensation shares by sex and educational attainment are calculated by
adding estimates of fringe beneﬁts to data on wage and salary income per
employed person from the Census. Capital stock data are available from
the Capital Stock Study of the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Na-
tional Balance Sheet, published by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. Further details are given by Jorgenson (1990).
Other Data Sources
Data on investment tax credits and average marginal corporate tax rates
for Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy are avail-
able in the data set supplied by Julian Alworth. The Institute for Fiscal
Studies also provides estimates of statutory rates, and net present value of
allowances for buildings and producer durable equipment for 1979 to 1994
in their recent publication Taxing Proﬁts in a Changing World. The OECD
publication Labour Force Statistics contains data on population from 1976
to 1996. Dougherty (1992) provides further details.
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